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INCENTIVIZING THE ORDINARY USER 
Gaia Bernstein∗ 
Abstract 
 
Disputes regarding the effectiveness of the patent system focus on the 
appropriate scope of patent rights. This Article departs from the traditional 
debate and looks instead at the players regulated by the patent system. This 
Article shows that the patent system fails to effectively encourage 
technological dissemination because it focuses on the patent owner and his 
competitors but largely ignores a crucial player: the ordinary user.  
The user, in his everyday decisions of whether to adopt a technology, 
plays a critical role in determining whether a new technology will be 
disseminated. Yet patent law contains an overly simplistic view of the 
ordinary user. It views the ordinary user as motivated only by price and 
availability. This Article uncovers the intricacy of ordinary users’ 
technological adoption decisions. It identifies two principle factors that 
influence user resistance to new technology: novelty and perceived 
consequences.  
Many believe that the market rule should govern the adoption process 
of new technologies, that is, the market should decide which technologies 
society adopts. Yet this rule fails to recognize the variety of factors that 
influence the ordinary user. This Article proposes that while government 
action to encourage user adoption should not be the norm, government 
action that gently nudges the user could prove particularly effective in 
cases of market failures. In conclusion, this Article suggests two instances 
in which government action is particularly warranted: first, when market 
failure occurs because a technology is dependent on network effects and 
the accumulation of a critical mass of users; second, when there is a critical 
need to disseminate a technology quickly.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Critics of the patent system argue that it fails to achieve its goal of 
advancing progress. They argue that it fails to advance progress through 
the promotion of innovation and dissemination because Congress and the 
courts have overly expanded patent owners’ rights.1 This Article focuses 
                                                                                                                     
 1. While most scholarship focuses on the effects of strong patent rights on innovation, some 
scholars argue that strong patent rights inhibit dissemination. For scholarship on the effect of strong 
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on the dissemination of new technologies—their social adoption process. It 
offers a novel outlook on patent law’s failure to effectively encourage the 
dissemination of new technologies.2 Instead of focusing on the strength of 
patent rights, it points to the patent system’s neglect of an important class 
of players which has a critical influence on technological dissemination. 
The patent system focuses on the patent owner and his competitors while it 
largely fails to acknowledge the significant role of the ordinary user—even 
the couch potato—in his important everyday decisions to adopt or not 
adopt a new technology.3 
User decisions determine the fate of many technologies. For example, 
electronic book readers, such as the Kindle and the Nook, currently flood 
our markets. Users of electronic readers can instantaneously purchase and 
carry with them a practically unlimited number of weightless books that 
users can easily read off the device’s screen. Yet many potential users 
refuse to purchase electronic readers—they prefer the comfort of the old-
fashioned paper book and lament a world of bare library walls no longer 
adorned by books.4 Similarly, handwritten health records in hospitals and 
physicians’ offices can now be replaced with electronic records that 
                                                                                                                     
patent rights on innovation, see generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents 
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (describing 
the detrimental effect of strong patent rights on downstream scientific discoveries); Arti K. Rai & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 289 (2003) (discussing the detrimental effects of university-owned patents on scientific 
research). For scholarship on the effect of strong patent rights on dissemination, see generally Gaia 
Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2292–301 (2010) (discussing 
the effects of strong patent rights on the dissemination of genetic testing); Jeanne C. Fromer, The 
Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75 (2008) (discussing the importance 
of looking beyond conception in the context of the nonobviousness analysis). 
 2. The goal of this Article is not to replace the traditional insights regarding the impact of 
the scope of patent rights on the effectiveness of the patent system. Instead, the objective of the 
Article is to shed additional light on the problems that underlie the effectiveness of the patent 
system and expand the existent discourse. 
 3. Few scholars address the importance of the social acceptance of a technology by the 
users. For exceptions, see generally Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New 
Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002) (discussing 
the historical acceptance process of the technology of artificial insemination); Erik Lillquist & 
Sarah E. Waldeck, Government Action in Emerging Networked Technologies, 87 OR. L. REV. 581 
(2008) (discussing the social acceptance process of electronic payments). 
 4. See LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET AM. & LIFE PROJECT, TABLET AND E-BOOK READER 
OWNERSHIP NEARLY DOUBLE OVER THE HOLIDAY GIFT-GIVING PERIOD 2 (2012), available at 
http://libraries.pewinternet.org/files/legacy-pdf/Pew_Tablets%20and%20e-readers%20double%201. 
23.2012.pdf (showing that although the rate of e-reader ownership is rising steadily, as of 2012, the 
majority of the U.S. population still does not own e-readers); see also Shantella Y. Sherman & 
James Wright, eBooks Come of Age, WASH. INFORMER (Sept. 1, 2010), http://washingtoninformer.com/ 
news/2010/sep/01/ebooks-come-of-age (discussing concerns regarding the demise of books and 
libraries). 
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centralize all available records about a patient and reduce errors caused by 
illegible handwriting and missing information. Yet some of the systems’ 
users—medical professionals who are unfamiliar with the novel 
technology—resist. They claim that the entry of information into the 
system detracts from their ability to focus on their medical duties.5 In both 
cases, it is neither the patent owner nor the competitors who are 
responsible for the extent of dissemination of the technologies. Instead, 
regular everyday users are the ones who play this vital role. 
This Article begins by examining the patent system’s tools that are 
designed to promote the dissemination of inventions once they enter the 
market. It examines two doctrines—compulsory licensing and patent 
misuse—and demonstrates that both doctrines focus on the patent owner 
and his competitors to indirectly nudge the user. Misconduct of the patent 
owner can trigger both doctrines, which then look to the patent owner’s 
competitors to facilitate dissemination as they increase production and 
reduce prices. In essence, these doctrines treat competition as a proxy for 
dissemination; they assume that if price is reduced and availability 
increased, innovations will attain increased user adoption.6 
Patent law focuses on the patent owner and his competitors because it 
contains a simplistic view of the user as motivated by only price and 
availability. This Article uncovers a more nuanced view of the ordinary 
user by providing a taxonomy of reasons for user resistance to adopting 
new technologies. It identifies two main sources of user resistance to new 
technology: novelty and perceived consequences of adopting the 
technology. Users who resist a technology due to its novelty may resist the 
novelty of the hardware, as in the case of electronic book readers, or they 
may resist the novelty of the technology’s complexity. At the same time, 
users may resist a technology due to perceived economic consequences of 
the technology, such as employees’ fears of being replaced by technology; 
owners’ reluctance to lose investments in older technologies; and the 
unattractiveness of a technology that has yet to achieve a critical mass of 
users. Users may also fear noneconomic adverse effects, such as fear of 
genetically modified food because of potential effects on personal health or 
the environment. Finally, they may resist a technology because they view it 
as a threat to their moral or religious values, such as the fear that human 
cloning will impact the uniqueness of human identity.7 
                                                                                                                     
 5. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300jj-11 (2012) (listing the goals of electronic health records); Milt 
Freudenheim, Many Hospitals Resist Computerized Patient Care, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, at C1 
(describing resistance among physicians to use electronic health records systems); Sharona Hoffman 
& Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health 
Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 112–19 (2008) (describing the benefits of electronic 
health record systems). 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
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While the law regulates the invention of new technologies through the 
patent system, the prevailing view is that the market efficiently determines 
which technologies society eventually adopts. Yet relying solely on market 
governance to control the adoption of new technologies is problematic. 
First of all, reliance on market governance can carry grave costs. History is 
replete with adoptions of important and eventually successful technologies 
that society resisted or delayed for decades and even centuries. Secondly, 
the belief that the market alone determines the fate of new technologies is, 
in fact, unfounded. The government, on all levels, regularly intervenes in 
many subtle and some unsubtle ways to encourage users to adopt new 
technologies.8 
The technology-regulating regime is charged with the promotion of 
progress.9 Yet patent law, which focuses on innovation and encouraging 
competition, executes only part of this mission through rules enforcing 
compulsory licensing and patent misuse remedies. This Article underscores 
the need for broader, systematic thinking and coordination of the 
technology-regulating regime to directly encourage user adoption of 
patented and unpatented technologies alike.10 The goal of this Article is not 
to set a norm of government action. In fact, some technologies are 
unsuccessful inventions that users legitimately resist.11 Yet governmental 
action to promote user adoption is already taking place on a broad scale 
through Congress, federal agencies, and state and local governments. 
Presently, though, these efforts are piecemeal, uncoordinated, and 
inconsistent.12  
While it does not focus on institutional design, this Article builds on the 
important work done by Professors Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai, who 
propose an “Office of Innovation Policy” to coordinate government 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 10. The assumption that underlies this project is that technological innovation is a primary 
contributor to long-term well-being. Specifically, this Article relies on writings that describe how 
biological and agricultural innovations decrease disease and hunger and contribute to health; how 
innovations in communications and information technologies contribute to educational, political, 
and social development; and how innovation generally propels economic growth, which contributes 
to increased and more egalitarian well-being. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, 
Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 n.24 (2008) 
(reviewing literature on the topic). For literature that focuses on technological diffusion and 
adoption—as opposed to just invention—as means for the promotion of human progress, see 
THOMAS R. DEGREGORI, A THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT xi–xiii (1985) and JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY 
AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 10–11 (1990). 
 11. See, e.g., Dan Tynan, The 25 Worst Tech Products of All Time, PCWORLD (May 26, 
2006), http://www.pcworld.com/article/125772/the_25_worst_tech_products_of_all_time.html 
(describing the reasons for the failure of twenty-five technology products). 
 12. See infra Section III.B. 
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agencies’ decision-making regarding innovation.13 The articulation and 
enforcement of guidelines to promote user adoption through the type of 
agency proposed by Benjamin and Rai could improve the coherency and 
consistency of government policies. Such guidelines could identify when 
governmental action to encourage user adoption is particularly warranted 
or when it may be unnecessary, and could lay out effective action modes.  
Opponents of government action to encourage user adoption point to 
the difficult process of selecting winning technologies. They caution that 
the government is likely to err and encourage the adoption of mediocre 
technologies, perhaps even at the expense of superior ones. To address this 
concern, this Article proposes that the government should limit its action to 
gentle nudges to encourage user adoption. Government should not be 
coercive and mandate the adoption of a particular new technology, making 
it the only viable option. Furthermore, this Article proposes that 
government action should be limited only to new classes of technology, 
which is where user resistance is most likely to occur, and should not 
advance one competing technology over another.14  
Finally, this Article argues that although market forces can overcome 
some instances of user resistance, government action is particularly 
warranted in cases of market failure. This inquiry takes the first step to 
indicate the usefulness of systematic thought about government action to 
encourage user adoption. To do so, it identifies cases in which government 
action is particularly warranted, and through that it sheds light on where 
such action may not be necessary and the market may be better suited to 
overcome user resistance. This Article highlights two instances of market 
failure that could warrant government action. These scenarios are not 
meant to be an exhaustive list. The first scenario is where a technology is 
characterized by network effects and requires the attainment of critical 
mass to achieve widespread adoption. The second scenario involves cases 
of urgency—where time is of the essence.15  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines post-market-entry 
patent law doctrines to reveal patent law’s overly simplistic view of the 
players who influence technological dissemination. Part II highlights the 
important role of the user’s everyday technological adoption decisions and 
provides a taxonomy of causes for user resistance. Part III reveals the risks 
of sole reliance on market governance for the adoption of new 
technologies. Part IV highlights the need for an institutional actor to 
articulate and enforce systematic guidelines for identifying when 
                                                                                                                     
 13. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & ARTI K. RAI, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., 
STRUCTURING U.S. INNOVATION POLICY: CREATING A WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF INNOVATION POLICY 2 
(2009). 
 14. See infra Section IV.B. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
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encouragement of user adoption through gentle nudges is warranted. Part V 
highlights two instances of market failure in which action to encourage 
user adoption would be warranted. 
I.  THE PATENT SYSTEM’S ROLE POST-MARKET ENTRY 
Scholars, judges, and litigants generally agree that patent law is charged 
with the promotion of progress through advancement of both innovation 
and dissemination.16 Yet the parties disagree as to whether the patent 
system executes its mission effectively.17  
Critics of the patent system focus on the effect of strong patent rights on 
innovation and argue that broad patent rights impede subsequent 
innovation.18 It appears that the focus on innovation may have obstructed a 
careful examination of the patent system’s treatment of dissemination. Far 
fewer critics focus on dissemination and those who do so generally extend 
the innovation prism to criticize the patent system’s effect on 
dissemination. Specifically, they argue that strong patent owner rights 
enable patent owners to increase prices beyond the threshold intended for 
patent monopoly, and thereby unjustifiably restrict public access.19  
This Part sheds light on the patent system’s failure to effectively 
promote dissemination, and shows that patent law cannot execute its 
mission because it fails to adequately account for all the players who 
                                                                                                                     
 16. For discussions of innovation and progress, see Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2264–68  
(describing how academics, legislators, and courts celebrate innovation as the promoter of 
progress). For discussions of dissemination and progress, see generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual 
Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006); Thomas F. Cotter, Memes 
and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331 (2005). 
 17. See, e.g., James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to 
Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic 
Drug Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 778 (2003) (arguing that strong patent rights promote 
innovation in drug development); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the 
Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 822–
23 (2001) (discussing the role of patent law and antitrust law in encouraging innovation, focusing 
on upstream research products). 
 18. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (describing successful peer production on the Internet in the absence of 
intellectual property rights); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1 (describing the detrimental effects of 
strong patent rights on downstream scientific discoveries); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 1 
(discussing the detrimental effects of university patenting on scientific research). See also Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the 
Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010) (discussing the limits to creative 
production outside the intellectual property paradigm). 
 19. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Current Controversies Concerning Patent Rights and Public 
Health in a World of International Norms, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 673, 673 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2008); Amy Kapczynski, 
Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s 
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1580–81 (2009). 
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influence technological dissemination. Patent law doctrines focus on the 
patent owner and his competitors but largely ignore the crucial role of the 
ordinary user. In essence, patent law treats competition as a proxy for 
dissemination, assuming that once the price barrier is eliminated through 
competition, dissemination will be accomplished. 
Many patent law doctrines are designed to achieve a balance between 
incentivizing the patent owner and promoting the general public welfare by 
encouraging the dissemination of new technologies.20 Yet the doctrines 
that directly affect dissemination are those that regulate the invention after 
it enters the market. This Part examines two doctrines that apply to the 
invention after its market entry: compulsory licensing and patent misuse. It 
will show that both doctrines focus on the actions of the patent owner and 
his competitors, aiming only indirectly to nudge the ordinary user’s 
decision-making through the reduction of price. Both doctrines treat 
competition as a proxy for dissemination and assume that once the price 
barrier is removed, then dissemination will occur. 
A.  Compulsory Licensing 
Compulsory licensing is intended to encourage dissemination of 
inventions in the marketplace. Unlike most of patent law, which focuses on 
the earlier stages of the technological process, compulsory licensing 
focuses on the dissemination stage and seeks to enhance the use of the 
technology. Under this doctrine, the government issues a compulsory 
license that permits a party other than the patent owner to make, use, or sell 
a patented invention without the patent owner’s consent.21 Compulsory 
licenses usually, although not always, provide for royalty payments to the 
patent owner.22 
                                                                                                                     
 20. For example, the exclusivity period is limited to twenty years to ensure that after a limited 
period for profit-making, competitors can produce and disseminate the invention more broadly. See 
35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (stating that the term of the patent shall be for twenty years from 
application). Similarly, the goal of the disclosure requirement is to release information about the 
patented invention that competitors can use to disseminate the invention once the patent expires. Id. 
§ 112(a) (requiring that a patent application contain a written description enabling any person 
skilled in the art to make the invention). 
 21. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 13 (Comm. Print 1958); NUNO PIRES DE 
CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 315 (2d ed. 2005); Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs 
at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt 
Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 857–58 (2003); Gianna Julian-Arnold, International 
Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 349, 349 (1993). 
 22. Chien, supra note 21, at 868–69 (stating that the government more rarely issues royalty-
free licenses, usually in cases of misconduct). 
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Generally, there are four cases in which governments issue compulsory 
licenses:23 (1) where the patent owner engages in anticompetitive behavior, 
as in merger cases where otherwise the merged entity would control a large 
part of the market;24 (2) when the patent owner does not use the patent;25 
(3) when the invention is needed to serve the public interest, for example, 
to supply drugs or for purposes of national defense;26 and (4) when others 
wish to exploit a dependent patent that cannot be used without infringing 
another patent.27 
U.S. law does not include a general provision for compulsory 
licensing.28 Yet the United States is a signatory of several treaties that 
endorse compulsory licensing regimes. These treaties include the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,29 the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),30 and the 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 21, at 349–50. 
 24. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31(k), Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (providing fewer conditions for the issuance of 
compulsory licenses when the patent owner engaged in anticompetitive behavior); see also Jonathan 
M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection and the Network Model 
of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987, 1044–51 (2000) (describing the issuance of compulsory 
licenses in merger cases). 
 25. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 
1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (authorizing compulsory licenses in cases of nonuse). For a 
discussion of the issuance of compulsory licenses and patent nonuse, see Kurt M. Saunders, Patent 
Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 389, 434–49 (2002). 
 26. TRIPS, supra note 24,  art. 31(b) (allowing the issue of compulsory licenses where the 
technology is necessary to serve the public interest under certain conditions); see also Amy 
Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for 
University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1061–62 (2005) (discussing difficulties 
faced by developing countries attempting to issue compulsory licenses under TRIPS). 
 27. TRIPS, supra note 24, art. 31(l).  
 28. Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects on the Conflict 
Between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 711, 712 
(2003); Saunders, supra note 25, at 439. 
 29. Paris Convention, supra note 25, § 5(a) (allowing the issuance of compulsory licenses); 
Saunders, supra note 25, at 436 (stating that the United States is a signatory of the Paris 
Convention); Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue - Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL 
J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 329–30 (2007) (describing compulsory licensing under the Paris 
Convention).  
 30. TRIPS, supra note 24, art. 31 (providing the conditions for the issuance of compulsory 
licenses); Steven D. Anderman, The Competition Law/IP ‘Interface’: An Introductory Note, in THE 
INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 1, 15 (Steven D. 
Anderman ed., 2007); see also Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands 
of Fact from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 371, 396–411 (2009) 
(discussing the scope of compulsory licensing under TRIPS); Kevin Outterson, Disease-Based 
Limitations on Compulsory Licenses Under Articles 31 and 31 BIS 17–19 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 09-26, 2009), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/working 
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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).31 Thus, while 
compulsory licenses are relatively rare in the United States,32 through its 
treaty obligations and an amalgamation of statutory provisions, the United 
States may, and at times does, authorize some version of a compulsory 
license in three of the four above-mentioned categories.33 
The ultimate goal of compulsory licensing is to increase availability and 
reduce the price of the technology in order to enhance dissemination and 
encourage user adoption. Yet compulsory licensing focuses on the actions 
of the patent owner and her competitors. Although the law’s objective is to 
encourage user adoption, the law contains a simplistic view of the user as 
motivated by availability and price alone. Therefore, it concentrates on 
deciphering and influencing the conduct of the patent owner and her 
competitors. First, the patent owner’s actions or failures to act instigate the 
issuance of a compulsory license in three of the four situations in which a 
government issues compulsory licenses: anticompetitive behavior, patent 
nonuse, and refusal to license to a dependent patent. As for the fourth 
public interest category, some causes, such as a sudden need for a drug, are 
not related to the patent owner’s behavior. Yet other causes—which 
include refusal to increase manufacturing, refusal to license to additional 
manufacturers, or refusal to lower prices despite public need—stem from 
the patent owner’s conduct. Hence, in most cases, governments issue 
compulsory licenses as an antidote to a patent owner’s behavior that limits 
dissemination of an invention. 
While the patent owner’s conduct instigates the issuance of compulsory 
licenses, the law of compulsory licensing focuses on the patent owner’s 
competitors to resolve the dissemination problem. By compelling the 
                                                                                                                     
papers/documents/OuttersonK052009.pdf (discussing the U.S. position that compulsory licenses 
under TRIPS should be limited to certain diseases).  
 31. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) art. 1709(10), Dec. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 
289; Torrance, supra note 29, at 334 (discussing the impact of NAFTA’s compulsory licensing 
provisions on U.S. patent policy options).  
 32. Torrance, supra note 29, at 336.  
 33. For an example of the anticompetitive behavior category, see In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 
F.T.C. 842, 897–98 (1997) (requiring the merged company to license some of its gene therapy 
patent rights to a competitor). For an example of the nonuse category, see 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) 
(granting the U.S. federal agency that funded the invention march-in rights to issue licenses if the 
patent owner refuses to do so). For examples of the public interest category, see 28 U.S.C. § 1498 
(2012); Chien, supra note 21, at 862–63 (explaining that the federal government may use 
inventions without a patent owner’s consent for just compensation, but a patent owner may not 
receive injunctive relief, which prevents the patent owner from refusing to license); Kenneth J. 
Nunnenkamp, Compulsory Licensing of Critical Patents Under CERCLA?, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 397, 404–05 (1994) (explaining that the Clean Air Act permits states to issue compulsory 
licenses for air pollution reduction technologies if their use is necessary to meet federal air quality 
standards). There are no examples in U.S. law of the issuance of compulsory licenses to allow 
exploitation of a dependent patent. 
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patent owner to license to competitors, the law seeks increased production 
of the invention to promote increased dissemination. While the debate 
surrounding compulsory licensing mostly focuses on the effect of 
compulsory licenses on innovation,34 the underlying assumption is that the 
issuance of compulsory licensing would improve access directly or 
indirectly by reducing price.35 Hence, the law of compulsory licensing uses 
competition as a proxy for dissemination and focuses on increasing 
availability and eliminating the price barrier. 
B.  Patent Misuse 
Patent misuse originally developed as a common law equitable 
affirmative defense to an infringement claim similar to the traditional 
Unclean Hands Doctrine in tort law. Defendants sued for patent 
infringement may claim as a defense that the patent owner misused her 
patent grant.36 If the defense is successful, the patent is effectively 
unenforceable. Courts will refuse to grant the patent owner an injunction or 
damages until the patent owner stops any misuse and until the effects of the 
misuse dissipate.37 
The patent misuse defense applies when the patent owner takes unfair 
advantage of his patent rights in the market.38 Examples of actions courts 
consider patent misuse include: discriminatory licensing, in which the 
patent owner charges some licensees more than others;39 restrictions on the 
                                                                                                                     
 34. For the debate on the effects of compulsory licensing on innovation, see generally  
Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory 
Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71 (2011) (discussing effects of 
compulsory licensing on innovation in drug development) and Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, 
Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 265 
(2010) (using compulsory licensing as a working example for a proposed positive bargaining theory 
for intellectual property rights). 
 35. See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 13–14, 
66, 78 (1977). 
 36. R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS §18.1 (4th ed. 2010); see also Mark A. 
Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1618–
19 (1990) (criticizing the lack of an injury requirement). 
 37. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.6 (2d ed. 2010); Lemley, supra note 36, at 1613.  
 38. MOY, supra note 36, § 18.1. Although courts and the legislature greatly constricted the 
patent misuse defense through the years, certain actions by patent owners are still considered 
misuse. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 37, § 3.2 (describing the historical demise of patent 
misuse).  
 39. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9, 16–17 (D. Alaska 1965) 
(finding discriminatory licensing rates of shrimp peeling machinery to constitute patent misuse); 
MOY, supra note 36, § 18.31.  
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licensee’s ability to resell units of the patented invention;40 requirements 
that the licensee pay royalties beyond the patented invention (e.g., royalties 
based on the licensee’s total sales or continued payment of royalties after 
the patent expires);41 and tying arrangements that require the licensee to 
purchase other things from the patent owner in addition to the subject 
matter claimed in the patent (e.g., agreements that require the licensee to 
purchase unpatented supplies).42  
Protection of competition appears to be a core concern of the patent 
misuse defense.43 Similar to compulsory licensing, patent misuse attempts 
to encourage dissemination by encouraging competition. The goal is for 
competitors to raise patent misuse as a defense in order to increase 
availability and reduce price for the end user. Yet while the law carefully 
considers the conduct and motivation of the patent owner and his 
competitors, it addresses the user only indirectly. In all patent misuse cases, 
the law focuses on the acts of the patent owner who has taken unfair 
advantage of the patent and solves the problem by absolving the owner’s 
                                                                                                                     
 40. See, e.g., Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding 
that the patent owner’s setting of a resale price for a product that inhibits plant growth constitutes 
patent misuse), rev’d in part on other grounds, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 41. MOY, supra note 36, §§ 18.38, 18.40; see, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33–34 
(1964) (holding that requiring a licensee to pay a royalty past the expiration of the patent constitutes 
patent misuse); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
requiring a licensee to pay a royalty past the expiration of the patent constitutes patent misuse). 
 42. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (2012) (limiting liability for patent misuse for tying to cases 
where the patent owner has a market monopoly). For examples of tying arrangements, see Morton 
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489–90 (1942) (where the patent owner agreed to 
lease his patented machine that automatically deposited salt tablets only if customers agreed to buy 
all their salt tablets from the patent owner); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 
U.S. 27, 30–31, 33–34 (1931) (where the patent owner tied the sale of his patented invention to the 
sale of unpatented carbon dioxide). 
 43. Many scholars point to the language of the Federal Circuit in Windsurfing v. AMF, which 
reframed the test with antitrust competition terminology and stated that “the alleged infringer [must] 
show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the grant 
with anticompetitive effect.” Windsurfing Int’l v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 
see also Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 913 (2007) (citing Windsurfing and 
stating that the “Federal Circuit itself has come to define patent misuse as ‘impermissibly 
broaden[ing] the “physical or temporal scope”’ of the patent grant with anticompetitive effects” 
(alteration in original)). Some commentators note that patent misuse law goes beyond the traditional 
competition objectives of antitrust law because for some patent licensing arrangements, courts apply 
the per se rule, which does not investigate whether the arrangement, in fact, affects competition. 
See, e.g., Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS 
L.J. 399, 401, 436–38, 449 (2003). Yet although courts that evaluate licensing investigations under 
the per se rule do not look at the effects on competition in the specific case, they assume that the 
restriction is so onerous that the restrictions must affect competition. See J. Dianne Brinson, Patent 
Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357, 359, 394 (1990) (stating that 
under patent misuse’s per se rule, certain licensing practices are, without inquiry into circumstances 
of use or economic consequences, presumed to seriously threaten competition). 
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competitors from liability for patent infringement. For example, courts that 
hold that a tie-in constitutes patent misuse prevent the patent owner’s 
unjustifiable inhibition of competition in technologies that are related to 
the patented invention. By defining the act as patent misuse and preventing 
the patent owner from enforcing his patent, courts strengthen the patent 
owner’s competitors under the assumption that competition will lower 
prices, increase availability, and thereby enhance dissemination of these 
related technologies.44 Hence, the law of patent misuse, like the law of 
compulsory licensing, focuses primarily on the patent owner and his 
competitors and embodies a simplistic view of the user as motivated by 
availability and price alone.  
II.  THE USER AND THE DISSEMINATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
Patent law doctrines focus on the actions of the patent owner and his 
competitors. The goal of the doctrines is to ensure a low price and 
increased availability of the technology. The assumption underlying these 
laws is that technological dissemination is dependent on availability and 
price alone. The market narrative presumes that once the price is lowered 
and the technology is widely available, then the market will determine 
which technology is worthy of adoption. Yet the market narrative is 
lacking.45  
This Part will uncover the important role of the ordinary user in 
determining the fate of new technologies. It will also present a more 
nuanced view of the user. It will show that the market narrative is lacking 
because the ordinary user is not motivated by price and availability alone. 
This Part reveals that there are many sources of motivation for the ordinary 
user to resist a new technology. Specifically, this Part will categorize these 
reasons into two broad categories: resistance due to novelty and resistance 
due to the perceived consequences of the technology. 
A.  The Impact of the User’s Adoption Decision 
Scholars recently looked beyond the inventor or creator to the role of 
the user in influencing technological design. These scholars emphasize that 
the user’s values and preferences shape the technology he uses. However, 
these scholars do not focus on the ordinary user, but rather focus on the 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am., 283 U.S. at 33–34 (“The Dry Ice Corporation has no 
right to be free from competition in the sale of solid carbon dioxide. Control over the supply of such 
unpatented material is beyond the scope of the patentee’s monopoly; . . . . The present attempt is 
analogous to the use of a patent as an instrument for restraining commerce.”). 
 45. See Joel Mokyr, The Political Economy of Technological Change: Resistance and 
Innovation in Economic History, in TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS IN EUROPE: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 39, 39 (Maxine Berg & Kristine Bruland eds., 1998) (arguing that the market test is 
often insufficient). 
13
Bernstein: Incentivizing the Ordinary User
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1288 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
creative user. They emphasize the role of the user as an innovator and his 
influence on technological design.46 
Indeed, the focus on the user as an innovator is an important step 
toward illuminating the process of technological adoption. History is 
replete with examples of users operating technologies differently than their 
designers expected them to be used. Individuals may use a technology for a 
different function than the inventors’ intended uses. For example, phone 
companies originally promoted the telephone for use only as a business 
tool. It was the users who transformed the telephone into a social tool.47 
Yet the focus on the user as an innovator highlights only part of the crucial 
role of the user in the dissemination process of new technologies. The user 
can play a role as an innovator, but her role as a consumer determines the 
fate of new technologies on a much more crucial and broader scale. The 
user in her role as a potential consumer—even the couch potato—regularly 
determines the fate of technological artifacts.48  
                                                                                                                     
 46. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 70−72 (2005) (describing the 
innovative user); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 951, 954 (2004) (showing that “copyright’s former consumers are now the creators, producers, 
and disseminators of content”). See generally Benkler, supra note 18 (describing peer production 
projects through which many individuals cooperate together to create); William W. Fisher III, The 
Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2010) (discussing legal conflicts 
between user innovators and producers); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications 
for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008) (distinguishing the user–innovator from the 
prevailing conception of the seller–innovator in patent law and focusing on research tools 
inventions). But see generally Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 347 (2005) (providing a broader conception of the user that she defines as “the situated 
user”). 
 47. See Claude S. Fischer, “Touch Someone”: The Telephone Industry Discovers Sociability, 
in TECHNOLOGY AND CHOICE: READINGS FROM TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 87, 88 (Marcel C. 
Lafollette & Jeffrey K. Stine eds., 1991); Roger Silverstone, Eric Hirsch & David Morley, 
Information and Communication Technologies and the Moral Economy of the Household, in 
CONSUMING TECHNOLOGIES: MEDIA AND INFORMATION IN DOMESTIC SPACES 15, 19, 21−26 (Roger 
Silverstone & Eric Hirsch eds., 1994). Users’ choices can also constrict the functions of a new 
technology and those functions may disappear or change altogether. Id. 
 48. Consumption is important because it can also define identities and human relations. Even 
in the most mundane process of integrating new technologies into the household, both artifacts and 
people change and meanings are produced. The purchase of certain technologies could be central to 
an individual’s or household’s efforts at self-creation and could affect the relationship between 
members of the household and the outside world. For example, teenagers use their consumption of 
music as a ticket into a peer group. See Merete Lie & Knut H. Sorensen, Making Technology Our 
Own? Domesticating Technology into Everyday Life, in MAKING TECHNOLOGY OUR OWN? 
DOMESTICATING TECHNOLOGY INTO EVERYDAY LIFE 1, 8−9 (Merete Lie & Knut H. Sorensen, eds., 
1996); Nelly Oudshoorn & Trevor Pinch, How Users and Non-Users Matter, in HOW USERS 
MATTER: THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF USERS AND TECHNOLOGIES 1, 12, 14 (Nelly Oudshoorn & 
Trevor Pinch eds., 2003); Silverstone, Hirsch & Morley, supra note 47, at 15, 19, 21–26. For a 
discussion of domestication, see generally Anne Sofie Laegran, Escape Vehicles? The Internet and 
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The user, who influences the fate of a new technology in her basic 
decision of whether to adopt it, may be a consumer, an employee within an 
organization, the management of an organization, or a member of the 
public whose actions affect the decisions of direct adopters. All these share 
in common their crucial effect on the fate of a new technology. Hence, this 
Article defines “user” broadly as a user or potential user who may choose 
to adopt or reject a technology.  
The user plays an important role in the adoption or rejection of a new 
technology. Resistance to the adoption of new technologies takes many 
forms. Behaviors constituting resistance to new technology include both 
consciously motivated behavior and avoidance behavior. They include both 
overt opposition and passive reluctance to use a technology.49 Individuals 
who demonstrate against nuclear power are overt rejecters of a technology, 
whereas passive rejecters include the woman who refuses to buy 
genetically modified food in the supermarket and the aging writer who 
refuses to substitute his typewriter for a computer and word processor. All 
these forms of conduct affect the fate of a new technology.  
User resistance to the adoption of new technologies may result in the 
complete rejection of a new technology.50 For example, our computer 
keyboard—QWERTY—is considered inferior to an alternative keyboard—
DVORAK—which users rejected.51 User resistance may also significantly 
delay the adoption of a new technology. For example, artificial 
insemination in humans was invented at the end of the eighteenth century, 
but it reached mainstream adoption much later during the 1940s and 
                                                                                                                     
the Automobile in a Local-Global Intersection, in HOW USERS MATTER: THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF 
USERS AND TECHNOLOGIES, supra, at 81. 
 49. Some writers use narrower definitions of resistance. See Martin Bauer, Resistance to New 
Technology and Its Effects on Nuclear Power, Information Technology and Biotechnology, in 
RESISTANCE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 14–15 (Martin Bauer ed., 1995) (defining resistance to include only behavior 
motivated by a purpose and not avoidance behavior); Dorothy Nelkin, Forms of Intrusion: 
Comparing Resistance to Information Technology and Biotechnology in the USA, in RESISTANCE TO 
NEW TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra, at   
379, 379 (focusing on overt opposition and excluding passive reluctance). 
 50. While this Article focuses on complete rejection of specific technologies, resistance could 
take subtler forms, such as reluctance to learn about sophisticated uses of a video recorder, despite 
still using its basic functions, or refraining from using a technology in certain ways, such as not 
using personal data on a computer. See Ian Miles & Graham Thomas, User Resistance to New 
Interactive Media: Participants, Processes and Paradigms, in RESISTANCE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY: 
NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 49, at 255, 256. 
 51. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332 
(1985); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 817 (1998). 
But see generally S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1990) (arguing that use of the QWERTY keyboard is efficient and that users justifiably rejected the 
DVORAK keyboard). 
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1950s.52 Finally, certain population groups may refuse to adopt a 
technology and thereby restrict dissemination. For example, some parents 
reject childhood inoculation technology when they refuse to vaccinate their 
children against childhood diseases due to fear that these inoculations may 
cause autism.53 
B.  Factors Influencing the User’s Adoption Decision 
Doubtless, price and availability of a technology are significant factors 
in when or whether users adopt a technology. Price is also closely related 
to the technology’s perceived relative advantage—the ratio of the expected 
benefits and the costs of adoption in the eyes of the user. The technology’s 
relative advantage is affected by: low price, economic profitability, 
decrease in discomfort, social prestige, and savings of time and effort.54 
Yet many additional factors influence the user’s willingness to adopt a 
technology. The ordinary user is a multifaceted creature whose motivations 
and complexities should be carefully examined because of his crucial 
importance to the fate of new technologies. This section focuses on the 
main reasons that lead to user resistance to the adoption of a new 
technology.55 The dissemination process of a new technology may be 
inhibited by one or a combination of these factors. Diverse groups of users 
may resist the same technology for a different set of reasons. These reasons 
can be divided into two categories: the novel nature of the technology and 
the perceived consequences. 
1.  Novelty and User Resistance 
Users resist technology because of its “newness.” Yet, their resistance 
to “newness” is comprised of different reasons. First, some individuals 
may resist the newness of the hardware or the process of the new 
technology.56 For example, despite the advantages of electronic book 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1049, 1060–83. 
 53. See Katherine Seligman, Vaccination Backlash: There’s a Small but Stubborn Faction of 
Parents Who Don’t Vaccinate Their Children. Are There Risks?, S.F. CHRON. (May 25, 2003, 4:00 
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Vaccination-Backlash-There-s-a-small-but-2645779.php 
(describing a growing movement of parents who refuse to vaccinate their children); Sue Bennett, 
The Shot Felt Round the World: Did an Immunization Trigger Your Child’s Autism?, AUTISM 
COACH (Oct. 14, 2004), http://www.autismcoach.com/Articles.asp?ID=269 (reporting on a poll 
surveying parents’ beliefs that vaccinations caused their children’s autism). 
 54. See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DISSEMINATION OF INNOVATIONS 229–30, 233 (5th ed. 2003). 
 55. There are many factors that affect the adoption of new technologies. Additional factors 
not discussed in detail are the triability of the invention (can it be tried on a limited basis?), its 
observability (whether one sees others using it), users’ socioeconomic status, and users’ personality 
traits. Id. at 258–59, 288–90. 
 56. See Bauer, supra note 49, at 19. 
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/7
2014] INCENTIVIZING THE ORDINARY USER 1291 
 
readers such as the Kindle, the idea that paper books will become obsolete 
deters many.57  
Second, newness often entails complexity, and users may reject a 
technology if they perceive it as relatively difficult to use. This is 
particularly the case when a technology is incompatible with a preceding 
idea. Old ideas are the main tools that people use to assess new ideas and 
give them meaning.58 A historical example from the 1980s involves the 
adoption process of home computers. Users went through periods of 
frustration while they learned how to connect the computers and how to 
run software. Although personal computers eventually became 
commonplace in the American household, their perceived complexity was 
an important negative force in their adoption rate in the 1980s. Eventually, 
as home computers became more user friendly, their adoption rate 
increased.59  
A technology’s perceived complexity also inhibits adoption within 
organizations. Bureaucracies function on routine and standard operating 
procedures that resist change.60 For example, hospital personnel impeded 
the transition from handwritten records to computerized electronic records. 
The adoption of electronic records61 provides many advantages, which 
include reductions in prescription errors due to illegible handwriting and 
the ability for authorized physicians to access relevant information about 
their patients no matter where the patients received previous treatment.62  
Despite these advantages, training personnel to adjust to complex 
systems is cumbersome. Medical providers and personnel need to adjust to 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Sherman & Wright, supra note 4, at 28–29 (discussing concerns regarding the demise of 
books and libraries). As of January 2014, 28% of adults in the United States reported reading an e-
book in the previous year while 70% reported reading a book in print. The majority of the 
population still prefers reading printed books despite a rise in use of e-readers. Katherine Zickuhr & 
Lee Rainie, E-Reading Rises as Device Ownership Jumps, PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT (Jan. 16, 
2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/01/16/e-reading-rises-as-device-ownership-jumps. 
 58. ROGERS, supra note 54, at 243–46.  
 59. Id. at 257–58.  
 60. See Joel Mokyr, Progress and Inertia in Technological Change, in CAPITALISM IN 
CONTEXT: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE IN HONOR OF R.M. 
HARTWELL 230, 236 (John A. James & Mark Thomas eds., 1994). The rate of adoption and nature of 
adoption in organizations is different. See ROGERS, supra note 54, at 221, 402–35. 
 61. Electronic health records generally have the following functionalities: display of health 
information and data (including medical diagnoses, allergies, and medications a patient is taking); 
result management (including laboratory test results and other treatment results); order entry and 
management (including computerized medication orders, such as prescription orders that are not 
handwritten); decisions support (including computer reminders that improve preventive care and 
disease management); and electronic communication and connectivity (including integrating 
medical records across treatment settings). Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 5, 108–09.  
 62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300jj-11(b) (2012) (listing the goals of electronic health records); Hoffman 
& Podgurski, supra note 5, at 112–19 (describing the benefits of electronic health record systems).  
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entering all the required data in the system’s preferred format and abandon 
their own methods of keeping charts; they need to become proficient at 
using the systems; and both patients and providers need to accommodate to 
the central place that the computer takes during the physician–patient 
interaction.63 Consequently, some physicians rebelled against the newly 
installed systems and complained that the time required to use the 
electronic systems distracts them from their medical duties.64  
2.  Perceived Consequences and User Resistance 
Users may refrain from adopting a new technology because they are 
concerned that the use of a technology will adversely affect either their 
everyday well-being or will be incompatible with deeply held beliefs. User 
resistance to the adoption of a new technology due to its perceived 
consequences can be broken into two categories. First, users may resist 
technological adoption due to perceived practical consequences, which 
include both economic and noneconomic effects. Second, users may resist 
technological adoption because of perceived consequences of the impact 
on moral and religious values. 
a.  Practical Consequences 
User resistance may stem from economic reasons. A primary economic 
reason for resistance to new technology is a fear of loss of jobs. Workers 
may fear that a new technology will render their skills obsolete.65 The 
                                                                                                                     
 63. See Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health Records on 
the Workplace, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 427–28 (2010) (discussing employers’ challenges 
in implementing electronic health record systems in the workplace). See generally Richard J. Baron 
& Elizabeth L. Fabens et al., Electronic Health Records: Just Around the Corner? Or Over the 
Cliff?, 143 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 222 (2005) (describing one practice’s difficulties in adjusting to 
an electronic health records system). 
 64. Ceci Connolly, Cedars-Sinai Doctors Cling to Pen and Paper, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 
2005, at A01 (describing staff rebellion at the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center that forced the Center to 
shelve its new electronic record system after three months of use); Freudenheim, supra note 5 
(describing resistance among physicians to the use of electronic health records systems). Resistance 
to the adoption of electronic health record systems is not motivated by its complexity alone. Users 
also resist these systems because of concerns over errors, the costs of purchase and implementation, 
as well as privacy and security concerns. See David Blumenthal, Stimulating the Adoption of Health 
Information Technology, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1477, 1477 (2009); Hoffman & Podgurski, supra 
note 5, at 119–24. 
 65. See Joel Mokyr, Technological Inertia in Economic History, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 325, 330 
(1992) [hereinafter Mokyr, Technological Inertia] (explaining that the more precise and valuable 
the skill or equipment being replaced, the greater the owner’s incentive to resist the technology that 
reduces its value); Joel Mokyr, The Political Economy of Technological Change: Resistance and 
Innovation in Economic History, DEP’T OF ECON., NW. UNIV., 23–24 (Mar. 1997), 
http://www.fsalazar.bizland.com/PYMES/Berg.pdf [hereinafter Mokyr, Political Economy of 
Technological Change] (describing fears that machinery will displace labor and cause 
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classic historical example involves the Luddites’ resistance to the 
Industrial Revolution in England, which produced protests that culminated 
in the breaking of machines. Workers feared that the machinery would 
displace them.66 These concerns are not confined to the past. Today’s 
electronic technology takes over many functions previously performed by 
individuals. For example, lawyers fear that technology could render some 
of their skills obsolete as new discovery software quickly scans for the 
necessary information and rapidly achieves results that previously required 
thousands of billable hours of work.67 
Users and organizations may also hesitate before they adopt a new 
technology due to sunk costs. Where investments and infrastructure already 
accommodate a previous technology or an existing way of doing things, it 
may prove more efficient to resist change.68 Particularly compelling is the 
effect sunk costs have on current computer keyboard design. The computer 
keyboard design used by most computer users is called QWERTY. Many, 
in fact, believe that QWERTY is a suboptimal keyboard design.69 Its 
arrangement of keys was selected to deal with an ancient technological 
problem—the clashing of type bars on the typewriter—that was solved by 
the nineteenth century.70 The DVORAK keyboard—designed to enable 
more effective typing—was invented in 1932, but users reluctant to adjust 
to a new typing method declined to adopt the new design. Existing users’ 
preferences repeatedly outweighed those of new users for whom it would 
have been more efficient to adopt the DVORAK design.71 
                                                                                                                     
unemployment). Technological change may also threaten nonpecuniary characteristics of labor by 
changing a physical work environment or transforming labor hierarchies. Laborers also resist these 
changes. See Mokyr, supra note 60, at 236. 
 66. For literature on the Luddite resistance, see generally BRIAN BAILEY, THE LUDDITE 
REBELLION (1998); Adrian Randall, Reinterpreting ‘Luddism’: Resistance to New Technology in the 
British Industrial Revolution, in RESISTANCE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 49, at 57; Mokyr, supra note 65, at 329–30. See 
also ADRIAN RANDALL, BEFORE THE LUDDITES: CUSTOM, COMMUNITY AND MACHINERY IN THE 
ENGLISH WOOLEN INDUSTRY, 1776–1809, at 4, 41–68 (1991) (examining the pre-Luddite period and 
showing that the woolen cloth industry in England between the 1770s and 1809 resisted machinery 
when it threatened employment or relocated workers into a new factory based system). 
 67. John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/science/05legal.html; see also KIRKPATRICK 
SALE, REBELS AGAINST THE FUTURE 223–28 (1995) (discussing post-World War II concerns of labor 
displacements).  
 68. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 139 (1999). 
 69.  For an explanation and history of the DVORAK keyboard, see The DVORAK Keyboard, 
MIT, http://www.mit.edu/~jcb/Dvorak/ (last visited June 11, 2014). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See David, supra note 51, at 332, 335–36; Gillette, supra note 51, at 817. But see 
generally Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 51 (arguing that use of the QWERTY keyboard is 
efficient and that users justifiably rejected the DVORAK keyboard). 
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Finally, users may believe a technology confers a reduced advantage 
due to its failure to attain critical mass. Interactive technologies can be 
prone to market failure because they are often characterized by “network 
effects.”72 Network effects exist in markets where the value an individual 
places on a good increases as others use the good. Once a critical mass of 
people use a particular technology, its rate of adoption accelerates.73 Thus, 
reaching a critical mass is imperative for the adoption of many interactive 
technologies.74 A classic example of a technology dependent on network 
effects is the Internet. The value of the Internet is a function of the number 
of people who connect to it.75 The Internet reached its critical mass point in 
1990 with four million users worldwide.76 Vendors and information 
providers found the Internet more lucrative as more people were online. At 
a certain point most offline businesses realized they had to offer an online 
service because a large percentage of their clientele transferred their 
purchasing activity online. In addition, when a technology reaches its 
critical mass, then people are less likely to abandon use of the technology 
because they become dependent on it.77 For example, in 2014, it is more 
costly for an individual to stop using Facebook unilaterally than it was for 
a Facebook user seven years earlier.78 
Individuals may resist new technologies due to other noneconomic 
practical consequences. Throughout history, individuals have resisted 
many new technologies that they believed threatened community health 
and common resources. Examples of resistance include protests against 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See Gillette, supra note 51, at 818. 
 73. See id. at 817–18. 
 74. Goods that do not have network effects have demand curves that slope downwards, that 
is, as price decreases consumer demand increases. However, goods that have network effects feature 
a different demand curve. The willingness of individuals to pay for the good increases as the 
number of goods expected to be sold grows and, therefore, price may increase instead of decreasing. 
See generally Nicholas Economides & Charles Himmelberg, Critical Mass and Network Size with 
Application to the US Fax Market 4–6 (N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. of Bus., Research Paper Ser. No. EC-
95-11), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/95-11.pdf. It should be noted, however, 
that the presumed increasing returns might not be the only effects at work because eventually other 
preferences may also affect choices. See ROGERS, supra note 54, at 343–45; Mark Lemley & 
William McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 497 
(1998). 
 75. See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT  L. REV. 
1257, 1281 (1998). 
 76. See ROGERS, supra note 54, at 343–44, 346–47.  
 77. See id. at 343–44; M. Lynne Markus, Toward a “Critical Mass” Theory of Interactive 
Media, in ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 194, 194, 197 (Janet Fulk & Charles 
Steinfield eds., 1990). 
 78. See Randall Stross, Getting Older Without Getting Old, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2010, at 
BU4; Facebook Users in the World: Facebook Usage and Facebook Growth Statistics, INTERNET 
WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/facebook.htm (last visited June 1, 2014) (noting 
the increased growth of Facebook users, reaching 835 million users in March of 2012). 
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nuclear power plants, nuclear waste disposal, and chemicals.79 Feared risks 
to personal or family health also played an important role in persuading 
individuals to refuse using new technologies. For example, consumers’ 
refusal to purchase genetically modified food also stems from concerns of 
risks to personal or family health and harmful effects to the environment.80 
Similarly, a vocal movement of parents refuses to vaccinate their children 
due to concerns that autism is linked to certain childhood vaccinations.81 
Other concerns that relate neither to health nor community well-being 
affect users’ willingness to adopt a new technology. Fear of discrimination 
can play a role in the rejection of a new technology. For example, despite 
the growing availability of genetic testing, studies show that many 
individuals decide not to undergo testing due to fear of insurance and 
employment discrimination.82  
b.  Impact on Moral and Religious Values 
Potential users may reject a technology due to cultural, moral, social, or 
religious reasons.83 Historical and current examples are plentiful. The 
                                                                                                                     
 79. See generally Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of 
Chemical Risks, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 285 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000) (discussing and comparing 
public and expert perceptions of risks in chemicals); Allan Mazur, Opposition to Technological 
Innovation, 13 MINERVA 58, 60–61 (1975) (showing that a perception of danger provoked popular 
opposition to both nuclear plants and the fluoridation of water supplies); Paul Slovic et al., 
Perceived Risk, Trust and the Politics of Nuclear Waste, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra, at 275 
(describing public opposition to nuclear waste disposal). On perceptions of risk of technology, see 
generally MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION 
OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982);  Judith A. Bradbury, The Policy Implications 
of Differing Concepts of Risk, 14 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 380 (1989). 
 80. See ALLAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA’S PICNIC BASKET: THE POTENTIAL AND HAZARDS OF 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 104–28 (2000) (discussing and addressing Europeans’ health and 
environmental concerns regarding genetically modified foods); Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety 
Regulation in the European Union and the United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525, 527−29 (1998) (describing Europeans’ opposition to genetically modified 
foods); Gregory N. Mandel, The Future of Biotechnology Litigation and Adjudication, 23 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 89–92 (2006) (discussing health and environmental concerns regarding 
genetically modified food).  
 81. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting 
Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 388–90 (2004) (pointing to fear 
of autism as one of the motivators of the antivaccination movement); Jane E. Brody, Vaccines and 
Autism, Beyond the Fear Factors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at F7 (reporting on concerns that 
mercury in vaccines causes autism); Gardiner Harris, Measles Cases Grow in Number, and Officials 
Blame Parents’ Fear of Autism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008, at A16 (reporting on an increase in 
measles cases due to parents’ concerns of a link between the measles vaccine and autism, despite 
evidence to the contrary). 
 82. Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and 
Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 255−64 (2006).  
 83. See DEGREGORI, supra note 10, at xi (explaining that some people will not use 
technologies because their belief systems forbid it); DAVID ELLIOTT & RUTH ELLIOTT, THE CONTROL 
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Amish community is best known for its religious opposition to technology. 
The Amish are a Christian religious sect that objects to the use of many 
technologies. To this day, they travel with horses and carriages and refuse 
to use electricity and common household appliances.84 Other religious 
groups oppose the use of reproductive technologies. For example, in 2008, 
the Vatican affirmed the Catholic Church’s opposition to use of different 
forms of reproductive technologies, including in vitro fertilization, based 
on the belief that every human life, including that of an embryo, is sacred.85 
Other possible users may resist certain technologies due to fear that they 
destabilize important moral and social values. For example, the desire to 
preserve the uniqueness of human identity and to preserve human dignity 
motivates opposition to diverse technologies. During the 1970s and 1980s 
as computers became prevalent, studies revealed that some individuals 
resisted computer usage because they feared the idea of an autonomous 
entity’s ability to perform the functions of human thought, and thereby 
downgrade man’s previously unique significance in the order of things.86 
Similar fears inspire resistance to robots that can replace human 
functions.87  
More recently, a different version of the argument was made to oppose 
human cloning. Objectors to human cloning argued that the replication of 
                                                                                                                     
OF TECHNOLOGY vii, 10 (1976) (arguing that the choice of one technology over another is based on a 
society’s scheme of values and priorities, which include cultural and religious beliefs); ROGERS, 
supra note 54, at 241–42, 249 (describing studies finding that incompatibility with values and 
beliefs is an obstacle to technological adoption); MOKYR, supra note 10, at 173–76 (tying societies’ 
technological progress to their value systems); Joel Mokyr, Technological Inertia, supra note 65, at 
327 (stating that historically, cultural and religious elements may have a big influence on 
technological decision-making). But see generally Jacques Ellul, The Technological Order, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY: READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF TECHNOLOGY 86, 86 
(Carl Mitcham & Robert Mackey eds., 1972) (arguing that technology is determinative and 
autonomous of social values). 
 84. See generally Lee J. Zook, Slow-Moving Vehicles, in THE AMISH AND THE STATE 145 
(Donald B. Kraybill ed., 1993) (describing reasons for the Amish’s use of horses and carriages in 
lieu of modern vehicles); Jameson M. Wetmore, Amish Technology: Reinforcing Values and 
Building Community, IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y MAG. Summer 2007, at 10, available at 
http://archive.cspo.org/documents/Wetmore-AmishTechnology-v2.pdf (describing Amish decision-
making regarding technological adoption).  
 85. See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS PERSONAE 
ON CERTAIN BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS (2008), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congre 
gations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_dignitas-personae_en.html.  
 86. Robert S. Lee, Social Attitudes and the Computer Revolution, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 53, 53, 
56–57 (1970). 
 87. See SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY AND 
LESS FROM EACH OTHER 23–147 (2011) (underscoring concerns regarding robots fulfilling human 
functions). 
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humans will undermine the uniqueness of individual identity, pose 
psychological problems for the cloned individuals, and generally erode 
human dignity.88 
The desire to preserve the uniqueness of human identity is only one 
social value that often stands in the way of the adoption of new 
technologies. Another example is the traditional social value of the family 
as a nuclear unit, which consists of a mother, father, and child who are 
genetically related. The technology of artificial insemination introduced the 
ability to produce a child with donor sperm. For over 150 years, society 
resisted this technology because, since children who were not genetically 
related to their fathers could now be born, it destabilized the traditional 
concept of the nuclear, genetically related family.89 
III.  THE MARKET GOVERNANCE RULE 
While the law regulates the invention of new technologies through the 
patent system, the prevailing wisdom is that the market should determine 
which technologies society eventually adopts.90 Advocates of market 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Human Cloning: A Choice or an Echo?, 23 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 247, 256 (1998) (stating that “[p]ersonal identity is at the heart of objections to human 
cloning”); Dan W. Brock, Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and 
Con, in CLONES AND CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 141, 150–55 (Martha 
C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998) (discussing the argument that human cloning violates 
the right to a unique identity); John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 1371, 1410 (1998) (discussing opposition to human cloning because it violates human dignity 
and identity); THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN 
ETHICAL INQUIRY (2002), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/cloningreport/ 
children.html (discussing problems of identity and individuality for the cloned child); Gina Kolata, 
Ethics Panel Recommends a Ban on Human Cloning, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/08/us/ethics-panel-recommends-a-ban-on-human-cloning.html 
(reporting that the National Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended that President Clinton 
continue the moratorium on the use of federal funding to support human cloning). 
 89. See generally Bernstein, supra note 3 (describing the social adoption process of the 
technology of artificial insemination). 
 90. See Helge Godo, Technological Evolution, Innovation and Human Agency, in DIVERSITY 
IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: HETEROGENEITY, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
18, 31–32 (Elias G. Carayannis & Aris Kaloudis eds., 2008); Maggie Mahar, Irrational Exuberance 
over Electronic Medical Records?, HEALTH BEAT BLOG (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://www.healthbeatblog.org/2008/12/irrational-exuberance-over-electronic-medical-records-.ht 
ml (quoting Dr. Rick Peters, founder and former CEO of Oceania, an early enterprise of electronic 
health records, who stated, “[T]he organizations set up by industry and the government to mandate 
standards . . . stifle innovation and . . . keep health care IT completely out of step with the general 
computer industry”); Tom Stricker, Comment to Sizing Up Obama’s Fuel Economy Standards, 
NAT’L J. EXPERT BLOG (Aug. 1, 2011, 5:42 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/201109280058 
36/http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2011/08/sizing-up-obamas-fuel-economy.php#2038012 (“Any 
company relying on favorable regulatory structure to succeed is missing the bigger picture, namely, 
that long-term success will ultimately shine on companies that meet customer demands at an 
affordable price.”). 
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governance believe that would-be adopters, whether individuals or 
corporations, will select the superior technology. As long as technologies 
are available on the free market, they maintain that the market will 
determine the optimal result for technological progress.91 Proponents of 
market governance point to the hazards of government action. Particularly, 
they underscore the difficulty of distinguishing between user resistance that 
protects society from costly duds and resistance that hinders progress.92 
Given some time, they argue, technologies that are advantageous to the 
consumer are likely to flourish and government action will be 
unnecessary.93  
This Part highlights the problems of relying solely on market 
governance. First, some very beneficial technologies incur significant 
delays before their eventual adoption. Second, market governance is, in 
fact, an illusion. The government at all levels—federal, state, and local—
already acts to encourage user adoption. Yet, it does so in an inconsistent 
and piecemeal manner.  
A.  The Costs of Delay and Nonintervention 
The appeal of allowing the market to determine the adoption of new 
technologies lies, at least partly, in its deceptive appearance of neutrality. 
Market choice may seem the natural state of events, but the decision to let 
the market control and to refrain from government action is itself an active 
choice, not necessarily a natural result.94 Moreover, this choice carries with 
it a cost. Superior technologies that are available for use at times undergo 
lengthy social adoption processes or are resisted altogether.95 A lengthy 
delay or complete rejection of an important technology undermines the 
overall goal of the intellectual property system—the promotion of progress. 
This is especially disconcerting because often it is the more radical 
inventions to which markets are particularly hostile.96 
Of course, not every rejected technology reduces human welfare and 
inhibits progress. Nuclear weapons are a paramount example of a 
                                                                                                                     
 91. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 
(Harper & Brothers 2d ed. 1947) (describing the process of creative destruction).  
 92. See Mokyr, Technological Inertia, supra note 65, at 328 (stating that this problem is not 
easily resolved). 
 93. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 623–35.  
 94. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 10 (2008) (stating that it is a misconception “that it is possible to avoid 
influencing people’s choices”). 
 95. See generally Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362–65 
(2010) (arguing that at least half of patented inventions in the United States are never commercially 
exploited). 
 96. See Godo, supra note 90, at 18, 32 (stating that while certain technologies, particularly 
incremental technologies, may be more effectively governed by the markets, markets are particularly 
hostile to radical innovations warranting government action). 
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technology without which many believe our world would be better off 
without. And some rejected technologies are, doubtless, unneeded 
innovations.97 Yet there are still plenty of examples of technologies that 
initially met social rejection only to be socially endorsed decades and even 
centuries later. Again, artificial insemination in humans serves as an 
example. Although many believe that the reproductive technology of 
artificial insemination in humans is a product of late twentieth century 
science, evidence of its existence was first recorded as early as the late 
eighteenth century.98 Artificial insemination technology can overcome 
infertility by using a syringe-type instrument to insert the sperm of the 
husband or donor into the woman.99 Yet despite the procedure’s simplicity 
and its need by many childless couples, the first reports of significant 
social use emerged only in the 1930s and 1940s.100 The costs of market 
governance are particularly evident when a new technology eventually 
becomes widespread, as was artificial insemination by the 1960s and 
1970s,101 but fails to benefit generations of potential users. In the case of 
artificial insemination, the cost was many infertile individuals who 
remained childless in the more than 150 years it took the procedure to 
become socially accepted.  
B.  The Illusion of Market Control 
Although many believe that the current system is one of market control, 
the government actually intervenes to encourage user adoption in multiple 
ways, many of them subtle and unnoticed by the casual observer.102 A 
current example involves the adoption of electronic health records by 
hospitals and private physician clinics. The government, in an effort to 
encourage adoption, undertook a variety of measures to encourage the 
process.103  
First, the government offered financial incentives to doctors and 
hospitals in the form of extra Medicare payments for the “meaningful use” 
of electronic health record systems. The government offered the highest 
payments for 2011 adopters and will gradually reduce payments until 
they’re phased out in 2016. The government’s goal was to incentivize rapid 
adoption by offering the highest incentives to the earliest adopters.104 
                                                                                                                     
 97. See, e.g., Tynan, supra note 11 (describing the reasons for the failure of twenty-five 
technology products).  
 98. Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1048–49. 
 99. Id. at 1037, 1049–50. 
 100. Id. at 1060. 
 101. Id. at 1083–84. 
 102. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 582 (stating that “[f]or our country’s entire history, 
government action—both direct and indirect—has affected what technologies will be adopted”).  
 103. Blumenthal, supra note 64, at 1478 (describing the government’s measures to encourage 
adoption of electronic health records). 
 104. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395W-4(o) (2012). 
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Second, the government instituted a set of penalties for physicians and 
hospitals that do not use electronic health records systems meaningfully by 
2015. Physicians will lose 1% of their Medicare fees in 2015 and the 
penalties escalate for each additional year of nonuse. Hospitals also face 
cuts in Medicare fees for failure to adopt these systems.105 Third, the 
government instituted a support structure for the installation of electronic 
health records systems. The law provides funds to create regional 
technology extension centers to help providers install the systems106 and 
train their workforces to use them.107 It also provides support for 
educational programs for health care professional training through 
curriculum development and student recruitment.108 Finally, the 
government acted to alleviate security and privacy fears. It required health 
care professionals and associated parties to promptly notify patients of a 
breach in the security of their electronic personal information.109 Further, it 
extended Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act (HIPAA) 
protections to health care providers and associated parties who deal with 
electronic health records.110  
Similarly, the government engaged in a variety of methods to encourage 
adoption of new payment systems. Professors Erik Lillquist and Sarah 
Waldeck provide a rich study of government action to encourage adoption 
of novel payment systems.111 First, the government provided the public 
with information to convince it to use new payment systems. For example, 
to promote public recognition and acceptance of electronic copies of 
checks, the government required that the electronic copies bear the legend: 
“This is a legal copy of your check. You can use it the same way you 
would use the original check.”112 The government also addressed public 
concerns over new payment systems. For instance, as the public began to 
use credit cards in the 1960s, concerns about theft and unauthorized 
charges accompanied the introduction of the cards. The government 
alleviated these fears by limiting cardholder responsibility to no more than 
fifty dollars of fraudulent charges and enacting criminal penalties for 
fraudulent credit card use.113 Further, the government granted incentives 
and imposed sanctions to support new payment systems. For example, the 
Transit Authority in New York City encouraged use of the Metro card by 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Id. § 1395W-4(a)(7)(A)(i). 
 106. Id. § 300jj-32(c). 
 107. Id. § 300jj-34(e)(3). 
 108. Id. §§ 300jj-35–36. 
 109. Id. §§ 17932, 17937.  
 110. Id. §§ 300jj-19, 17934, 17938.  
 111. See generally Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3. 
 112. 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b)(2) (2012); Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 608.  
 113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1643–1644 (2012); Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 612–13.  
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offering free bus transfers to Metro card users.114 Finally, the government 
ensured the adoption of new payment technologies by eliminating or 
severely curtailing the competition. For example, in 1863 the United States 
issued national bank notes, which faced stiff competition from state bank 
notes. Congress placed a 10% tax on state banknotes, thus making them 
prohibitively expensive and resulting in their elimination.115 
IV.  GOVERNMENT ACTION TO ENCOURAGE USER ADOPTION 
This Part highlights the importance of an institutional actor that will 
articulate and implement systematic guidelines to encourage user adoption. 
It relies on Professors Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai’s work, which 
underscores the need to create an Office of Innovation Policy. This type of 
institutional actor could supervise the implementation of user adoption 
guidelines by different government agencies. This Article proposes that the 
guidelines should identify when government action is warranted and when 
it is not. The guidelines should incorporate action through gentle nudges 
and refrain from coercive action to encourage user adoption. Moreover, the 
government should limit its action to encouragement of a class of 
technologies and should not differentiate between competing technologies. 
Finally, this Part addresses the tension between this proposal and patent 
law’s rejection of the Moral Utility Doctrine. 
A.  An Institutional Coordinator 
The goal of our technology-regulating regime is to promote progress, 
and this objective is strongly tied to the dissemination of new 
technologies.116 User adoption is vital to achieve technological 
dissemination. Yet policymakers give little systematic thought to the issue 
of user adoption. Admittedly, patent law incorporates some provisions that 
attempt to encourage user adoption by encouraging competition. However, 
patent law addresses only a small part of the spectrum of user resistance. 
And, again, while government action targeted at other aspects of user 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 614.  
 115. Id. at 620–21.  
 116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally David S. Olson, A Legitimate Interest in 
Promoting the Progress of Science: Constitutional Constraints on Copyright Laws, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 185, 187–92 (2011) (arguing that the framers intended the progress clause to 
promote the creation and dissemination of knowledge); Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed 
to Promote? Defining “Progress” in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001) (arguing that 
progress under the constitutional provision incorporates dissemination). On the interpretation of the 
term “progress” in the intellectual property clause, see generally Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the 
Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual 
Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006).  
27
Bernstein: Incentivizing the Ordinary User
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1302 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
resistance occurs on a broad scale on all government levels—federal, state, 
and local117—it occurs in a piecemeal and inconsistent way.118 
An institutional actor charged with promulgating and implementing 
guidelines to encourage user adoption could provide a systematic and 
consistent way to address user adoption issues for patented and unpatented 
technologies alike. The goal of guidelines developed to target user 
adoption is not to set a norm of government intervention. In fact, some 
technologies are unsuccessful and users legitimately resist them.119 Instead, 
the objective of these guidelines should be to identify when a technology 
warrants government action and when it does not as well as the best ways 
to achieve user adoption. These principles would improve coherency and 
consistency in an important area that has thus far received little attention.  
Under the current regime, government action to encourage user 
adoption is highly decentralized. A shift toward more centralization 
requires institutional change. Detailed institutional design is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but the following discussion relies on the important 
work done by Professors Benjamin and Rai on this topic. Benjamin and 
Rai make a compelling case for the creation of an Office of Innovation 
Policy.120 Although they do not address the issue of user adoption, they 
define innovation broadly to include dissemination through putting the 
invention into productive use.121 
Benjamin and Rai suggest that the creation of a new Office of 
Innovation Policy can address the problem of different governmental 
agencies pursuing innovation strategies that are in tension, if not even 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 106–17. 
 118. See supra Part III.  
 119. See, e.g., Tynan, supra note 11.  
 120. BENJAMIN & RAI, supra note 13, at 2. Another potential candidate is the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO), but the PTO currently lacks substantive rulemaking authority on 
patentability issues, such as subject matter or nonobviousness, which it decides on a daily basis. See 
Arti Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for 
Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2053 (2009). Although recent proposals emphasize 
the need to expand the PTO’s authority, it is unlikely that the government will expand its authority 
beyond the grant of patents to formulate and enforce rules to regulate user adoption. For proposals 
to expand the PTO’s authority, see generally Sichelman, supra note 95, at 400–10 (proposing that 
the PTO should issue a commercialization patent in exchange for a commitment to commercialize a 
product not available in the marketplace); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1747 (2011) (arguing for the need to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority); John 
Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041 (2011) (arguing 
for the need to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority for issues of patentable subject 
matter); Jonathan Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275 (arguing for the need to grant 
the PTO substantive rulemaking authority). 
 121. BENJAMIN & RAI, supra note 13, at 2. (defining innovation policy as focusing on 
promoting “the creation and diffusion of technology”).  
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contradictory to each other.122 They propose an executive entity that would 
have some authority to push agencies in a way that will promote 
innovation.123 
Benjamin and Rai’s proposal strikes an important balance between 
centralization and decentralization. They emphasize that centralization 
allows for efficiency, coordination, clarity, and interorganizational 
learning, but at the possible cost of bad decision-making.124  
Since government agencies such as the Federal Drug Administration 
and the Federal Communications Commission have specialized 
knowledge, which is valuable for informed decision-making, Benjamin and 
Rai do not advocate an Office of Innovation Policy with the power to 
block.125 Instead, they suggest a “Hard Look Review” regime under which 
agencies are obliged to consider all arguments, even those that do not 
correspond with their position, and respond publicly to the Office of 
Innovation Policy’s position. At the same time, the specialized government 
agencies are not obligated to implement the Office of Innovation Policy’s 
position.126  
Although not specifically envisioned under Benjamin and Rai’s 
scheme, an Office of Innovation Policy-type agency could also promulgate 
user adoption guidelines and enforce them under the mechanisms those 
authors propose. This could improve systematic thought and resolve 
coordination and inconsistencies regarding action intended to encourage 
user adoption. Furthermore, it could also alleviate the problem of capture. 
Currently, decisions regarding government action to encourage user 
adoption are often made by specialized agencies, state or local 
governments. Benjamin and Rai explain that capture is more likely to 
occur when an agency covers one or two industries and less likely when it 
has a broader scope.127 Hence, overview by an Office of Innovation Policy-
type agency is likely to reduce capture concerns as well. 
B.  Gentle Nudges 
Advocates of market governance argue that while the market will select 
successful technologies that offer a significant advantage, the government 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 4 (“Even when U.S. government entities like federal agencies and courts actually 
focus on innovation, they generally act without having much awareness of what other institutions 
faced with similar problems have done—much less coordinating with those institutions. Improving 
the awareness and coordination of innovation-related activities among federal agencies and courts 
could be tremendously helpful.”). 
 123. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 10, at 6. 
 124. BENJAMIN & RAI, supra note 13, at 8. 
 125. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 10, at 58, 63. 
 126. BENJAMIN & RAI, supra note 13, at 11–12.  
 127. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 10, at 58, 78–79. 
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may force upon society technological failures. Technological failures may 
be technologies that do not offer a significant advantage or technologies 
that are inferior to other technologies. Particularly, the government may be 
quick to adopt the first prototype of a new class of technologies and make 
it less likely that individuals will invent or users will adopt more 
sophisticated embodiments later on. To address these concerns, this Article 
proposes that the government act through gentle nudges to encourage user 
adoption and refrain from coercive action that prevents society from 
choosing to adopt a specific technology.128 In addition, the proposal is to 
limit government action to encourage the adoption of new categories of 
technology. It does not suggest that the government should intervene to 
encourage one version of a particular technology over another.  
Law and social norms scholars distinguish between gentle nudges and 
harsh shoves.129 Harsh shoves force change by eliminating or curtailing the 
older technology or mandating the adoption of a new technology to 
perform a previously non-technological function. The adoption of digital 
television is an example of a harsh shove. The government required all 
full-power television stations to broadcast exclusively in digital format as 
of June 12, 2009.130 Consequently, the public had to either purchase a 
digital television set or connect their television to an analog-to-digital 
converter. In essence, the government eliminated the option of analog 
broadcasting to promote digital broadcasting.131 The public did not have 
the option to decide whether they believed digital broadcasting was, in fact, 
superior and worthy of adoption. 
To compare, there are many different forms of gentle nudges. The goal 
of this Article is not to provide a full survey of potential gentle nudges but 
to illustrate some significant examples. Patent law already incorporates 
some gentle nudges through compulsory licensing and patent misuse laws. 
This proposal seeks to expand the range of gentle nudges the technology-
regulating regime offers to address the complexities of user resistance.  
First, the government may offer information about a new technology132 
by, for example, facilitating or funding training, as it is currently doing to 
                                                                                                                     
 128. But cf. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 623–35 (arguing that government action, 
whether through gentle nudges or hard shoves, is generally inadvisable). 
 129. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 94, at 5–6 (explaining that gentle nudges influence 
people’s choices while still letting them opt out); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: 
Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 619–20 (2000) (defining gentle nudges 
as less condemnatory norms than harsh shoves).  
 130. The Switch to Digital Television (DTV) is Coming, DTVANSWERS.COM, 
http://www.dtvanswers.com/toolkit/DTVQ&Aj.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Lillquist & Waldeck, supra note 3, at 608–12; see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 
94, at 190–91.  
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encourage the adoption of electronic health information systems.133 The 
government could also offer information through an advertisement 
campaign. Second, the government may take action to alleviate concerns 
about a particular technology. The government can reduce fears that 
surround a technology through legislation, as the government did when it 
enacted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 partly to 
alleviate fears of genetic discrimination.134 The government can also ease 
concerns through an advertisement campaign. For example, when the 
government wanted to convince the public to take the swine flu vaccine, it 
used a massive advertising campaign to emphasize that the vaccine does 
not carry any hazardous side effects.135 Third, the government may provide 
incentives to induce individuals to adopt a new technology and also 
enforce sanctions against those who refuse to adopt the technology. As 
illustrated previously, physicians and hospitals that timely adopt electronic 
health records systems will receive incentives in the form of additional 
Medicare payments, while those that resist adoption will eventually lose 
part of their Medicare compensation.136 
Gentle nudges, as opposed to harsh shoves, facilitate user adoption 
only; they do not coerce social acceptance. Even a collection of gentle 
nudges, like in the case of electronic health records, does not amount to a 
harsh shove. A nudge is not a shove as long as a user may still choose not 
to adopt a technology. The government is less likely to lock society into 
use of an inferior technology through gentle nudges that do not coerce 
adoption. Regardless of incentives, sanctions, advertising, training, 
information, and reduction of concerns, the public is unlikely to adopt a 
technology that does not confer a significant relative advantage.137 In a 
sense, government action through gentle nudges to encourage user 
adoption is similar to the government’s role in the encouragement of 
innovation through the grant of patents. The hope of getting a patent 
encourages innovative activity. In addition, the grant of a patent can 
                                                                                                                     
 133. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300jj-35–36 (2012). 
 134. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881; Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 471–74 (2010).  
 135. Paul Joseph Watson, Government Appoints Task Force to Handle H1N1 Vaccine 
Propaganda, PRISONPLANET.COM (Nov. 2, 2009, 11:45 AM), http://www.prisonplanet.com/govern 
ment-appoints-task-force-to-handle-h1n1-vaccine-propaganda.html. 
 136. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395W-4(a)(7), (o). 
 137. Professors Thaler and Sunstein describe gentle nudges as a form of “libertarian 
paternalism.” Gentle nudges influence people’s choices though gentle nudges still leave them the 
option to opt out. A nudge alters people’s behavior in a predictable way but does not forbid any 
options. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 94, at 4–6. 
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facilitate innovation because it signals the worth of the invention.138 Yet 
the patent system does not guarantee that a specific innovation will 
succeed. It merely provides a gentle nudge.  
Admittedly, although a gentle nudge is less likely to lead to the 
adoption of an inferior technology, there is still some risk that this may 
occur. This risk is inevitable, though, and it accompanies technological 
adoption processes dominated by the market as well. For example, users 
did not adopt the superior DVORAK keyboard over QWERTY because of 
sunk costs. Users were unwilling to invest the time and training required to 
adjust to a new typing system.139 
Finally, this Article suggests that the government should act through 
gentle nudges only where it seeks to encourage the adoption of a new class 
of technology. An example of intervention to encourage use of a class of 
technology is the government’s use of feed-in tariffs to subsidize use of 
solar energy. Users who install solar panels connected to the electrical grid 
receive subsidized payments for the electricity the panels generate.140 The 
government’s goal through this program is to encourage use of solar energy 
generally and not to advocate the use of a specific type of solar panel.141 
This is distinguished from government action to encourage the adoption of 
one of several competing technologies, as in the encouragement of the use 
of one drug over another where both operate in a similar fashion and 
achieve a similar result.142  
For two reasons, this Article proposes to limit government action to the 
encouragement of a class of technology rather than the promotion of one 
competing technology over another. First, government action is justified as 
a means to overcome user resistance. User resistance, for the variety of 
reasons discussed—novelty of hardware or process; novelty due to 
complexity; concerns about practical consequences such as loss of jobs, 
sunk costs, effects on personal health and the environment; and pressures 
on moral and religious values—generally does not rise when users select 
between competing technologies. User resistance usually occurs when 
                                                                                                                     
 138. For a discussion on the expressive function of the patent system, see generally Timothy R. 
Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 575–77, 594–97 (2006). 
 139. See generally David, supra note 51; Gillette, supra note 51, at 817. But see Liebowitz & 
Margolis, supra note 51 (arguing that use of the QWERTY keyboard is efficient and that users 
justifiably rejected the DVORAK keyboard). 
 140. David Grinlinton & LeRoy Paddock, The Role of Feed-In Tariffs in Supporting the 
Expansion of Solar Energy Production, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 943, 969–72 (2010) (describing states’ 
initiatives using the feed-in-tariff mechanism). 
 141. See id. at 944–46. 
 142. Admittedly, at times it may be hard to determine when a technology constitutes a separate 
class and when it is merely a competitor to another technology, but often the distinction is clear. For 
example, the Internet is clearly a separate class of technology, while Google+ and Facebook are 
without doubt competitor social network technologies. 
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users face a truly transformative technology—a new category of 
technology. Conversely, when users adopt one technology, they are 
unlikely to resist its competitors due to fear of novelty or consequences. 
Therefore, government action is particularly justified to encourage the 
adoption of a new category of technology where lack of adoption is more 
likely to result from user resistance.  
At the same time, user resistance does come up between competing 
technologies in one instance. This is where a technology requires critical 
mass. For example, Google+ currently struggles to lure users from 
Facebook in order to create a critical mass of users. Government action to 
select between competitors in such a case remains inappropriate in light of 
the general goals of the technology-regulating regime, which seeks to 
encourage dissemination in order to promote progress. Thus, dissemination 
of a new class of technology serves its overall goal, but distinguishing 
between competitors who offer different versions of the same technology 
does not impact the progress goal.143  
C.  The Moral Utility Objection 
An important objection to the incorporation of user adoption guidelines 
into our technology-regulating regime is that it contradicts the rejection of 
the Moral Utility Doctrine. Patent owners must satisfy the utility 
requirement in order to attain a patent—they must show that their patent is 
useful.144 In the past, moral utility was part of the general utility decision. 
The law considered whether an invention was “frivolous or injurious to the 
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”145 Thus, the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the courts evaluated the potential 
detrimental effects of an invention on society when they determined 
whether they should grant a patent for an invention. However, in recent 
years, patent law has rejected the Moral Utility Doctrine and refused to 
consider whether an invention is immoral or illegal.146  
                                                                                                                     
 143. One could argue that one version of the technology is so superior to another that its 
promotion over competitors does, in fact, promote progress. Yet it may be that in this case the 
technologies are not actually competing technologies, but the superior technology is in essence a 
new category of technology, even if it accomplishes similar functions as other technologies on the 
market. For example, most would agree that while both the VCR and the DVD accomplish the same 
function—enabling entertainment consumption at one’s own leisure—they are not competing 
technologies, but different categories of technologies. 
 144. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor . . . .”). 
 145. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). 
 146. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). But see 
Margo A. Bagley, The New Invention Creation Activity Boundary in Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY 
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The incorporation of principles to encourage user adoption into the 
technology-regulating regime will bring back the “social effects” question 
that was reflected in the moral utility analysis. Government agencies will 
need to determine whether the social effects of an invention require 
government action. It may, therefore, appear at first blush to contradict the 
rejection of the Moral Utility Doctrine. However, the differences between 
user adoption and moral utility decisions underscore that charging the 
government with user adoption decisions is not necessarily inconsistent 
with the rejection of the Moral Utility Doctrine.  
First, the moral utility decision is relevant to the early stages in the life 
of a technology. The PTO decides whether to encourage the invention and 
application to practice of a technology that may be immoral and injurious, 
or a court may later invalidate a patent because the PTO should not have 
granted the patent in the first place. Where a technology is at its invention 
or application to practice stage, its potential effects on society are less 
clear. An early decision that an invention is immoral and should not 
receive a patent because it does not meet the utility requirement may close 
unknown opportunities and preclude other potential uses for the 
technology.147 Conversely, user adoption decisions are usually made when 
the patented invention is already in the market and its potential uses are 
better known. Thus, it decreases the risk of an erroneous decision.  
Second, objectors to the Moral Utility Doctrine warn that the doctrine 
would deter inventors with controversial inventions from filing patents, 
which would have negative economic effects.148 This argument is 
irrelevant to user adoption decisions because these decisions take place 
later in the process—after the technology is invented and patented. 
Furthermore, while the Moral Utility Doctrine penalizes a technology when 
it denies patent protection, user adoption encouragement singles out a 
technology for a positive reward. The Moral Utility Doctrine will not affect 
competitors because government action should apply to a category of 
technology, not to a specific competitor. Thus, government action to 
encourage user adoption is unlikely to deter inventors. The opposite may in 
fact be true; inventors may be induced to increase their efforts if they 
believe their invention is truly revolutionary and could gain governmental 
support. 
                                                                                                                     
L. REV. 577, 591–97 (2009) (describing an international trend toward consideration of morality in 
invention creation activity). 
 147. Although a court may invalidate the patent later when more information is available, the 
basis for its decision is that the PTO should not have granted a patent in the first place because at 
the time of the invention there was no known utility.  
 148. Benjamin D. Enerson, Note, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The 
Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 715 (2004). 
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Finally, objectors to the Moral Utility Doctrine argue that the PTO is 
ill-equipped to make determinations regarding the social effects of diverse 
technologies.149 Again, this argument does not apply to the incorporation 
of user adoption principles into the law. These principles would help to 
create a systemized and consistent law to encourage user adoption, but the 
PTO would not implement them. The implementation would remain under 
the auspices of specialized agencies, Congress, and state and local 
governments.  
V.  INSTIGATORS FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION 
Government action is not the only way to overcome user resistance, nor 
is it always warranted. Promoters of new technologies will often try to 
overcome resistance in order to be successful in the marketplace. 
Particularly, they often work to overcome resistance due to novel 
complexity. Their efforts may include design changes to simplify the 
technology and advertisement campaigns that emphasize the ease of use.150 
In other instances, society may require a considerable adjustment time that 
precludes a hasty adoption. This is often the case where resistance is a 
result of pressures on moral or social values. Finally, some inventions may 
be unsuccessful technologies, without which society is better off. 
The goal of this Part is to take a preliminary step to identify situations 
in which government action is particularly justified. These are cases of 
market failure. In these cases, neither the actions of the patent owner nor 
her competitors are likely to overcome user resistance. This inquiry is a 
first step that seeks to indicate how systematic thought about government 
action to encourage user adoption can be useful. The goal of this 
preliminary inquiry is twofold: to identify situations that warrant 
government action and, through this investigation, to shed light on 
situations in which government action may not be necessary. If we do not 
embark on a systematic exploration of situations that are suitable for 
government action, we will be unable to identify situations in which the 
government action may be inappropriate. This section identifies two 
situations where government action is justified because of market failure. 
The two situations underscored are not an exhaustive list. These are cases 
where technologies are characterized by network effects that require 
critical mass for widespread adoption, and cases in which dissemination is 
urgent.  
                                                                                                                     
 149. See id. at 711. 
 150. For example, the Mac is known for its ease of use and Apple emphasizes this factor in its 
advertising. See, e.g., Compare Mac Models, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/mac/compare (last 
visited June 11, 2014) (“No matter which Mac you choose, you’re getting a computer that features 
the latest technology and is ready to help you do amazing things right out of the box.”). 
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A.  Network Effects: Attaining Critical Mass 
Government action is particularly important where a technology that is 
characterized by network effects requires support to acquire critical mass. 
Technologies characterized by network effects become desirable as more 
people use them. Once a technology reaches critical mass, its rate of 
adoption accelerates. For example, interactive technologies are often 
characterized by network effects—the more people who use them, the 
more functional they become. Consequently, it is often vital for interactive 
technologies to attain critical mass in order to achieve widespread 
dissemination.151 While some technologies characterized by network 
effects may be successfully adopted without government action, in other 
cases, government action could prevent a market failure.152  
The adoption of the Minitel—a videotext system that gave the French 
population many of the advantages of the Internet a decade earlier than the 
rest of the world—illustrates the significance of government action to 
attain critical mass and the ways in which a technology can attain a critical 
mass. While consumers gladly endorsed the convenience of online plane 
and train ticket purchase, grocery shopping, and abundant sources of 
information and opportunities for social interaction, few realized that many 
of these conveniences were available to large segments of the French 
population since the 1980s. Minitel153 offered French phone customers a 
multitude of online services including online banking; travel and ticketing 
reservations; specialized information services (finance, health, travel and 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See ROGERS, supra note 54, at 343–44; Economides & Himmelberg, supra note 74, at  4–
6; Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 673, 694–95 (1996); 
Markus, supra note 77, at 194–95.  
 152. Government action to create critical mass may also be warranted in some cases where the 
encouragement of standard-setting would promote interoperability. There are three options for 
standardization: industry players can coordinate to select a single standard; the market may tip to 
favor a certain standard; or the government may mandate a standard. Mark A. Lemley, 
Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 745, 747 (1999). In certain cases, where the market or industry players are unlikely to achieve 
standard-setting, the situation may warrant government action to prevent market failure. For 
discussions of government action compared to other methods of standardization, see generally 
Daniel Benoliel, Cyberspace Technological Standardization: An Institutional Theory Retrospective, 
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1259 (2003); Joseph Forrell & Garth Solaner, Competition, Compatibility 
and Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins and Lemmings (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Dep’t 
of Econ., Working Paper No. 8610, 1986); Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet 
Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041 (1996); Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards 
Regulation in the Network Age, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179 (2009). But see Michael L. Katz & Carl 
Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 112–13 (1994) 
(cautioning against government action in cases of network effects). 
 153. The system was officially known as the French national videotex system. William L. Cats-
Baril & Tawfik Jelassi, The French Videotex System Minitel: A Successful Implementation of a 
National Information Technology Infrastructure, 18 MIS Q. 1, 1 (1994). 
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entertainment); online ordering of goods such as groceries; messaging 
services (the anonymous sex forums were particularly successful); jobs and 
classified ads; and interactive games.154  
Minitel comprised a small monitor and a keyboard. It used the phone 
connection to transmit text to and from the user.155 Minitel reached 
mainstream adoption in France by the mid-1980s, soon after its 
introduction in 1982. Many households and businesses used Minitel on an 
everyday basis.156 Interestingly, in 1982, companies launched similar 
services that used the same technology in many other countries, including 
the United States, sixteen Western European countries, and Japan. Yet 
these systems failed to achieve the widespread dissemination enjoyed by 
the French Minitel. Consequently, residents of these countries waited until 
the mid-1990s to benefit from the advantages of an online system—the 
Internet.157  
Commentators raise different theories to explain the success of the 
French Minitel in comparison to the failure of similar online services in 
other countries. Particularly, they point to the rapid creation of a critical 
mass of Minitel users. Minitel is an interactive communication system. It 
requires a significant number of users to draw in service providers, who in 
turn bring in additional users. Thus, analysts explain that the French 
government’s monopoly on Minitel services and the initial free distribution 
of the system to all phone consumers rapidly brought in the necessary 
critical mass of users.158 Conversely, promoters of similar systems in other 
                                                                                                                     
 154. See Eric Brousseau, E-Commerce in France: Did Early Adoption Prevent Its 
Development?, 19 INFO. SOC’Y 45, 46 (2003); Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note 153, at 12. An email 
service was added in 1991. Id. at 8.  
 155. See H.L. Moulaison, The Minitel and France’s Legacy of Democratic Information 
Access, 21 GOV. INFO. Q. 99, 101 (2004). 
 156. In 1985, 39% of French businesses used Minitel. By 1990, 84% of French businesses 
used Minitel and a third of the population had access to it, whether at home or at work. Finally, by 
1992, about half the French population had access to Minitel. Brousseau, supra note 154, at 46; 
Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note 153, at 16.  
 157. See Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note 153, at 9; Ya-Ching Lee, Newspaper Online 
Services: A Successful Business? Lessons Learned from Videotext Failure 5– 6, 11–13 (July 1999) 
(Ph. D dissertation, Indiana University), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/down 
load?doi=10.1.1.42.9681&rep=rep1&type=pdf (discussing the failure of newspaper videotext 
systems in the United States); Miles & Thomas, supra note 50, at 255 (discussing the failure of the 
British videotext system).  
 158. Brousseau, supra note 154, at 46. Specifically, the government initially distributed 
Minitel for free as the only effective source of directory assistance. Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note 
153, at 4–5, 10, 15; Moulaison, supra note 155, at 101. Commentators identified additional factors 
that contributed to Minitel’s success. These factors included the easy-to-use design and the use of 
the French telephone system solely as a transmission gateway and not as an information provider. 
See Cats-Baril & Jelassi, supra note 153, at 9, 10–11, 15; Miles & Thomas, supra note 50, at 262–
66.  
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countries failed to meet the critical mass challenge.159 With the benefit of 
hindsight, based on the success of the Internet and Minitel, parallel online 
systems had the potential for mass adoption outside France during the early 
1980s. Yet, most of the world’s residents received the benefits of an online 
system over a decade later, when the Internet reached popular use.160 
B.  Urgency 
Market processes take time as different groups of users with different 
levels of risk aversion and technological sophistication decide whether to 
adopt a new technology.161 Some technological adoption processes take a 
year or less, while others may take decades or even centuries. Yet in times 
of national emergencies, particularly those involving health threats, 
governments may need to intervene to expedite the market process. 
Intervention in these cases is necessary because of the dire implications of 
a market failure to achieve widespread dissemination of the technology in a 
timely manner.162 The U.S. government’s intervention in the dissemination 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See, e.g., Ya-Ching Lee, supra note 157, at 5–6, 11–13 (discussing the failure of 
newspaper videotext systems in the United States); Miles & Thomas, supra note 50 (discussing the 
failure of the British videotext system).  
 160. Some believe that Minitel was not necessarily a success story because it delayed the 
adoption of the Internet in France. See, e.g., Hugh Dauncey, A Cultural Battle: French Minitel, the 
Internet and the Superhighway, 3 CONVERGENCE 72, 77–78 (1997) (pointing out that the French 
attachment to Minitel is one of the factors that delayed Internet adoption in the country); Amy 
Harmon, Why the French Hate the Internet, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2007), 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1997-01-27/news/mn-22569_1_french-culture (reporting that the 
French devotion to Minitel is part of the reason for their antagonism to the Internet). And, 
doubtless, Minitel did play a role in France’s delayed Internet adoption. Yet the picture is more 
complex. First, e-commerce fared differently than individual user adoption. Although in 1997 only 
22% of French businesses were online (compared to 58% in the United States), businesses could 
take advantage of the infrastructure and experience they gained in Minitel, and they closed the gap 
quickly. By 2001, 80% of all French businesses were online (compared to 88% in the United 
States). Brousseau, supra note 154, at 51. Second, adoption by individual users did lag behind. 
Between 1997–2007, the French individual user adoption lagged 25% behind the United States; the 
gap only began shrinking in 2007, and then closed in 2010. Internet Users (per 100 People), U.N. 
DATA (2012), http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=internet+users&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3aIT. 
NET.USER.P2. Although Minitel played a role in the user adoption delay, additional factors 
contributed, including a low rate of homeownership of personal computers and an underdeveloped 
cable network. See generally Brousseau, supra note 154. Third, even acknowledging  that Minitel 
did contribute to the delayed individual user adoption between 1997–2007, critics should balance 
the costs of this delay against the fact that from 1982–1995 the French exclusively possessed many 
of the advantages of the Internet. Furthermore, despite the slow rate of adoption from 1997, many 
French residents did enjoy both the Internet and Minitel throughout this period. 
 161. For a description of adopter types, including innovators, early adopters, early majority, 
late majority, and laggards, see ROGERS, supra note 54, at 282–85. 
 162. Sometimes market failure occurs when the window of opportunity is broader (beyond a 
few weeks or months or even a year) but time is still of the essence, as when the market delays 
adoption of environmental technologies designed to reduce pollution. Yet, the discussion of 
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of the swine flu vaccine illustrates the importance of expediting market 
processes in these situations. 
The swine flu epidemic broke out in the spring of 2009.163 In June of 
that year, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the swine flu to 
be the first pandemic in forty-two years.164 Deaths from the swine flu 
during the spring raised fears of a massive epidemic that would kill many 
once the flu season began in the fall of 2009.165 A flu vaccine was ready by 
the early fall of 2009.166 Yet, the government’s challenge was to vaccinate 
the population at large, beginning with the groups that were particularly at 
risk.167 Public health experts warned that health care providers should 
vaccinate the whole, or at least most, of the U.S. population within a 
couple of weeks to prevent massive outbreaks of the swine flu that could 
culminate in a large death toll.168 Under these circumstances, the 
government could not wait for market forces to take their course. The 
government faced a double task—to ensure not only an adequate supply of 
vaccine, but also to create demand for the vaccine by the population at 
large. 
The U.S. government acted quickly. First, it eliminated the price 
obstacle by providing the vaccine for free.169 However, it had to do much 
more to overcome resistance. The government vaccinated school children 
in public schools and opened centers in many communities during the 
weekends to facilitate the process of vaccination.170 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                     
whether these situations should also be included within the category of urgency is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
 163. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Declares Public Health Emergency Over Swine Flu, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/world/27flu. 
html?_r=0. 
 164. Niko Kyrakou, Swine Flu Didn’t Fly, DEEP J. (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://www.deepjournal.com/p/43/a/en/2527.html. 
 165. JoNel Aleccia, Swine Flu Fears Subside, but Second Wave Looms, NBC NEWS (May 4, 
2009, 9:41 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30563707.  
 166. See Donald G. McNeil, Swine Flu Vaccinations Start as Officials Attack Myths, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2009, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/us/07flu.html. 
 167. See Elizabeth Weise, Swine Flu Vaccine Arrives, and the Scramble Begins, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 2, 2009, at 1A, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-10-01-swine-
flu-vaccine_N.htm#. 
 168. See 2009 H1N1 Vaccination Recommendations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/acip.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2009); WHO 
Recommendations on Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_vaccine_20090713/en/index.html.  
 169. See Julie Bosman, Long Lines to Get Free Swine Flu Shot in New York City, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/nyregion/15clinic.html. 
 170. See Erin Allday, Thousands Swamp S.F. Clinics to Get Vaccines, S.F. CHRON. ( Oct. 30, 
2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Thousands-swamp-S-F-clinics-to-get-
vaccine-3282492.php; Michael Laris, D.C. Swine Flu Plan Includes Vaccination Hubs, Network of 
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government engaged in a massive advertisement campaign. It not only had 
to advertise the availability of the vaccine for free, but also had to 
overcome fears of the consequences of taking the vaccine.171 Many 
individuals were afraid to take the vaccine due to concerns about 
dangerous side effects. Specifically, they feared that the vaccine was new 
and different from previous flu vaccines, and therefore, entailed additional 
risks.172 
The feared swine flu epidemic did not break out during the flu season of 
2009–2010.173 Some critics argued that the swine flu vaccines were 
unnecessary and that the swine flu was never destined to become an 
epidemic. No consensus has yet been reached on this point.174 Yet, the 
criticism was targeted at the decision-making process and the conclusions 
of the medical agencies (the WHO and the Center for Disease Control 
(CDC)), not the government’s adoption of these conclusions and its 
implementation process.175 Given the recommendations of the medical 
                                                                                                                     
Health-Care Providers, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-09-
05/news/36857385_1_swine-flu-vaccinations-clinic-doctors. 
 171. HHS Secretary Sebelius Unveils New H1N1 Advertisement That Will Air During New 
Year’s College Football Bowl Games, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Dec. 31, 2009), 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/12/20091231a.html; Rich Thomaselli, Government PSA 
Urges Americans to Get Swine-Flu Vaccine, ADAGE.COM (Dec. 7, 2009), 
http://adage.com/article/news/advertising-psa-urges-americans-swine-flu-vaccine/140923/. 
 172. See Michael Specter, The Fear Factor, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/10/12/091012taco_talk_specter; Poll: One-Third of 
U.S. Parents Oppose H1N1 Vaccines, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2009, 4:34 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-10-07-swine-flu-poll_N.htm. 
 173. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, UPDATED CDC ESTIMATES OF 2009 
H1N1 INFLUENZA CASES, HOSPITALIZATIONS AND DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 2009 –APRIL 
10, 2010 (May 14, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/estimates_2009_h1n1.htm.  
 174. See, e.g., Philip Bethge et al., The Great Swine Flu Boosterism of 2009, S.F. SENTINEL  
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sanfranciscosentinel.com/?p=65052 (quoting Wolfgang Wodarg, a 
member of the German parliament, telling the European Council that “millions of people worldwide 
were vaccinated for no good reason”); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Reaction to Swine Flu: Apt and 
Lucky, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/health/ 
02flu.html?_r=0 (quoting leading medical professionals praising the government’s response); 
Editorial, H1N1dsight is a Wonderful Thing, 28 NATURE BIOTECH. 182, 182 (2010) (“Although the 
nature of the threat may have been overstated, the WHO, CDC and other authorities had little 
scientific evidence at the beginning of the H1N1 pandemic to discount the most dire predictions of 
fatalities.”); Billions Wasted Over Swine Flu, Says Paul Flynn MP, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10396382 (quoting disparate views regarding whether mass vaccination 
was a mistake). 
 175. Kyrakou, supra note 164 (reporting on criticisms of the WHO’s definition of pandemic 
and the allegations that the WHO created panic to boost vaccine sales); WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
DRAFT REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 
REGULATIONS (2005) AND ON PANDEMIC INFLUENZA A (H1N1) 2009, at 14–15, 18–19 (2011), 
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authorities at the time, vaccination of the population was imperative.176 
And it is clear that at that time, absent these steps, health care workers 
would have vaccinated a far smaller segment of the U.S. population. 
CONCLUSION 
While traditional critique of the patent system’s failure to encourage 
dissemination focuses on the increasing strength of patent rights, this 
Article showed that dissemination often fails because patent law largely 
ignores the ordinary user. The ordinary user is a critical player who 
determines the fate of new technologies through his mundane everyday 
decisions of whether to adopt a new technology. Yet, patent law treats 
competition as a proxy for dissemination and focuses on the patent owner 
and his competitors, but addresses the ordinary user only indirectly as it 
views him as motivated by availability and price alone.  
This Article explored the reasons for user resistance and showed that 
these can be categorized into two main sources of resistance: resistance to 
the novelty of the technology and resistance to the perceived consequences 
of using the technology. It argued that the technology-regulating regime 
should incorporate gentle nudges that address the complexities of the 
ordinary user. This Article revealed that although patent law contains some 
gentle nudges to indirectly encourage user adoption, the law addresses only 
a limited part of the reasons for user resistance. And while different 
government agencies currently attempt to encourage user adoption, they do 
so in a piecemeal and inconsistent manner.  
This Article underscored the need to incorporate a systematic 
framework of gentle nudges to address the full spectrum of reasons for user 
resistance. Specifically, this Article argued that government action, through 
gentle nudges to encourage user adoption, is particularly warranted in two 
instances of market failure: where a technology is characterized by network 
effects and needs to acquire critical mass, and where dissemination is 
urgent and time is of the essence.  
                                                                                                                     
manufacturers); Mike Adams, Flu Vaccines, Pharma Fraud, Quack Science, the CDC and WHO – 
All Exposed by Richard Gale and Gary Null, NATURAL NEWS (July 2, 2010), 
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